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The performance of military defense contracted companies after 
September 11th, 2001: The case of politically connected companies 
 
 
 
Derek J. Larsen 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect that the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 had on the stock prices of 
companies within the military defense industry. In addition, this paper studies the effect of the defense 
firms’ political engagement (through lobbying activities) and how this affected the stock price response to 
the terrorist attacks. Our study finds that the cumulative abnormal returns of these companies are 
positively significant and that companies who lobbied experienced higher returns relative to those who 
did not lobby.  
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Introduction 
Can the market perceive which military defense companies are politically engaged through 
activities, such as lobbying? Can the political engagement of defense firms explain the stock price response 
these firms had to one of the most infamous terrorist attacks in the U.S.?  With solemn respect for all those 
affected by such a horrific sequence of events these questions will be examined in this paper.  On the 
morning of September 11th, 2001, a series of catastrophic terrorist attacks were carried out against the U.S. 
as commercial airliners were hijacked and crashed into four various locations including the Pentagon and 
the two World Trade Centers. The attacks produced catastrophic losses, as 2,977 people were killed, which 
included 2,606 people at the World Trade Centers, 125 at the Pentagon, and 246 on the four planes (Kean, 
Hamilton 2004). Total physical damages climbed to $55 billion, $24 billion of which was expected income 
of lost lives and $8 billion for the value of the buildings. An overall tally of costs for toll of life, physical 
damages, homeland security related costs, war funding related costs, economic impact and future 
war/veterans’ care amounted to just under $3.3 trillion (Carter, Cox 2011). This puts into perspective the 
financially massive impact these attacks had the United States. Furthermore, many financial firms, 
brokerages, insurance firms and trading firms, which resided in the World Trade Center, were crippled due 
to the loss of life by many employees and the destruction of their offices.  
These attacks resulted in an exogenous shock to the domestic and international economies as well. 
The New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ were closed Tuesday morning on September 11th, to 
prevent panic selling within the market and did not reopen until Monday, September 17th. This is the first 
time in history that the exchange was closed for at least two days since the Great Depression when President 
Roosevelt closed all the exchanges in March of 1933 for an entire week to stop a run on banks (Jabaily, 
2013). The first day of trading following the attacks became the largest one-day loss in exchange history 
for the market index, dropping by 7.1%. The price of the S&P 500 index from closing on September 10th 
and opening on September 17th dropped 8.2%. During its first week the index lost 11.6% which is an 
estimated $1.4 trillion in value. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 7.13% on the first day, which up 
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to that point in time, was the worst one-day drop the DJI had ever experienced. By the end of the week it 
had fallen over 14% (Davis, 2017).  
Industries such as airlines, insurance, travel, tourism and hotels experienced major losses. Goodrich 
(2002) shows that within the first month of the attacks there were plans to lay off a combined 66,000 
employees of domestic airlines due to the financial struggles experienced because of the attacks. Further, 
he explains that tourism decreases immensely as the U.S. State Department issued a travel advisory to U.S. 
citizens.  There was an apparent fear that was observable from the markets point of view as investors felt 
exposed to more potential terrorist threats. Carter and Simkins (2004) show that on the first trading day 
after the attacks the markets stock prices sunk, especially those of airline companies. Further, their research 
shows that there were significantly large, negative abnormal returns for U.S. airlines and to smaller negative 
returns for international airlines. This proposes that the market believed this event was much more 
consequential for U.S. airlines compared to other foreign airlines. 
Neely (2004) demonstrates that the Federal Reserve recognized the imminent threat these attacks 
would have on the financial markets by providing an unusual amount of liquidity and reducing the federal 
funds rate more than anticipated to incentivize market activity. Nikkinen, Omran, Sahlstrom and Aijo 
(2006) investigate the short-term impact of the terrorist attacks on a global scale by analyzing data from 53 
different equity markets. They find that there were significant increases in volatility and negative returns 
across the majority of regions. Drakos (2009) displays the effect of event on the global markets by 
examining the MSCI World Index which represents large and mid-cap equity across 23 different developed 
markets countries. On September 11th, even though the NYSE and NASDAQ among other U.S. stock 
markets were closed, the MSCI World index experienced a loss of 1.98%. On the day that U.S. stock 
markets reopened the index lost 2.57%. These occurrences show that the terrorist attacks had a vast and 
immediate global effect on international stock markets as well as domestic stock markets.  
Prior research on military defense industry stock prices following terrorist attacks has also been 
examined to find the relationship between terrorist attacks and the reaction by stock prices in the military 
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defense industry. Essaddam and Douch (2013) look at the short- and long-term performance of the U.S. 
defense industry after the attacks using a multivariate regression analysis to see whether the market reaction 
was the same for each firm or whether the market differentiated based on differences among defense firms. 
They conclude that not all defense firms are equally exposed to the terrorist attacks. Rather, their analysis 
shows that 60% of the sample exhibited negative abnormal returns based on percentage of defense sales to 
total sales. E. Apergis and N. Apergis (2016) study the impact of the terrorist attack in Paris on November 
13th, 2015 on the stock returns within the defense industry. Their findings show an upward trend in 
cumulative abnormal returns in the post-attack period.  
All these economic reactions to such a catastrophic event portray just how connected the stock 
markets are to current events. Hayek (1945) elaborates by saying the decisions of investors in the market 
become a form of communication for current events. He states, “The whole acts as one market, not because 
any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently 
overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all.” These 
reactions via investment decisions through the market show that there was a detrimental response to what 
had happened. Participants in the financial markets were anticipating that military funding might increase 
which ultimately meant a new war was on the horizon. However, as shown by Essaddam and Douch (2013), 
there was a great deal of variation in how the stock prices of defense firms responded to the terrorist attacks.  
In this paper, we hypothesize that some of that variation can be explained by how politically 
engaged a defense firm was at the time of the attacks. More specifically, we seek to answer the question, 
do the firms with political connections have a greater stock price response to the attacks than those firms 
without political connections? 
Prior research on the importance of political connections was examined between government and 
companies. Blau (2017) discusses that companies who possess political connections benefit more so than 
those who don’t. These benefits include lower corporate tax liabilities (Richter, Samphantharak, and 
Timmons, 2009) and better access to debt capital (Chiu and Joh, 2004; Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson and 
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Mitton, 2003; and Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Goldman (2008) finds that companies with a politically 
connected board of directors received positive abnormal stock returns in periods of political 
announcements. Do, Lee and Nguyen (2015) find that companies connected to elected governors increased 
their firm value by 3.89% based on increase in state procurement and investing through the subsequent 
firms.   
These questions are examined to find what effect the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 had 
on all stock prices of companies linked to military defense contracts. In this paper we measure the 
cumulative abnormal returns of each company in periods that include different days prior to and after the 
event for comparison. We then attempt to control for certain variables of 24 companies tied to the military 
defense industry on September 17th, 2001, the day the stock markets were reopened. Those variables include 
the company’s market cap, price, turnover, spread, volatility, returns, and exchange listing. 
  According to our hypothesis, we identify 14 (of 24) firms who had positive lobbying expenditures 
versus 10 companies who did not from the year 1998 up to the terrorist attacks in 2001. Our hypothesis for 
this study is that the terrorist attacks had a positive impact on companies within the military defense 
industry. Further, we hypothesize that firms within the defense industry who lobbied experienced higher 
returns as opposed to the companies who did not. Our study first documents positive and significant 
abnormal returns for defense stocks in the days surrounding the attacks. Perhaps more importantly, we find 
that these results are entirely driven by firms that had lobbying expenditures during the years prior to the 
attacks. For instance, the 14 of the 24 firms that had lobbied experienced positive returns on the reopening 
day of the stock market. However, the 10 firms that did not lobby prior to the attacks did not have 
meaningful stock price responses to the attacks. Further, our multivariate tests confirm these results as we 
find that, after controlling for various firm/stock characteristics, lobbying activities explain the positive 
stock price response in the defense industry.  Said differently, we find that the lobbying variable is a 
significant factor by itself in the cross-sectional regression analysis.  
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Data Description 
The data used for this analysis comes from two sources. The Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) provides the historical stock data from which each variable within the summary of Statistics was 
obtained. These variables were collected for each of the 24 companies observed in this analysis. The 
historical data collected was used to observe the financial status of each of these companies on September 
17th, 2001 – the day that financial markets reopened after the September 11th Attacks. The historical data 
gathered includes Market Cap (MktCap), which is the total dollar market value of a company’s outstanding 
shares in $ millions. Price is the price of each company share at the close of the day. Turnover, which is the 
ratio of daily volume (on the event day) scaled by shares outstanding. Spread is the difference between the 
closing ask and bid prices for a stock – scaled by the spread midpoint. NYSE is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange – zero otherwise. Volatility is measured as 
the difference between the natural log of the intraday high price and the natural log of the intraday low price 
(following Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002). Finally, return is the CRSP raw return on the event day: 
September 17th, 2001.  
The second part of data collection comes from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP). The first 
variable, Lobby, is an indicator variable equal to unity if a firm had positive lobbying expenditures from 
1998 to 2001 – zero otherwise. The second variable is LobAmt/Cap, which is the ratio of the total amount 
of lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 scaled by market capitalization. We use these variables to 
approximate which firms had been involved in government lobbying in subsequent years leading up to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. From these collections of data, we attempt to determine whether or 
not lobbying can explain the price response to the terrorist attacks. 
Table 1 reports statistics that summarize the sample of 24 companies on September 17th, 2001 – 
the day that U.S. financial markets reopened after the September 11th attacks. The 24 companies chosen are 
all companies that conduct business within the military defense industry. Each variable of stock data was 
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obtained from The Center for Research Stock Prices (CRSP). Each collected variable was considered an 
important factor in portraying the status of each company within financial markets.  
Highlighting the 24 companies within the sample, the largest and smallest companies based on 
MktCap, respectively, are Honeywell International ($23,942.67) and Taser International ($22.77). The 
highest and lowest Return during the trading day respectively came from L3 Communication Holdings Inc. 
(0.381) and Triumph Group Inc. (-0.2089). The average company within this sample has a MktCap of 
$3,745.23 (in $millions), a Price of $31.22 per share and a Turnover ratio of 0.03 during the trading day. 
Furthermore, the average company has a Spread of 0.01, a Volatility metric of 0.11 and an average Return 
of 0.05 on the historical trading day. Lastly, of the 24 companies observed, 15 of them are traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange. Of the 24 companies the most recent initial public offering was in August of 
2001. Other companies within the sample have been publicly traded since 1978 or later. All these metrics 
show that even though the sample size is may be relatively small in size there is a diverse set of companies. 
The tests run in subsequent tables show significant results that make this smaller sample size feasible.   
Empirical Test and Results 
We begin by performing a standard event study around the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 
2001. Table 2 reports the results of this event study by taking the mean, median, and t-statistic of different 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the 24 company share price returns. Abnormal Returns (ARs) are 
the residual returns from a daily market model where raw returns for each firm are regressed on the CRSP 
value-weighted market index during a pre-event estimation period. The pre-estimation period ends for each 
firm 46 days before the event day (approximately two-months) and uses a maximum of 255 trading days in 
the estimation period (approximately one year of trading data). After obtaining intercept and slope 
parameters from the estimation period, we calculate ARs (or residuals) during several different event 
windows surrounding the event day. These windows surround the event of the stock market re-opening on 
September 17th, 2001. CAR(-5,5) can be explained as an 11-day event window that includes the 5 days 
prior to the event, the day of the event and the 5 days after the event. Other event windows included in the 
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study are CAR(-1,1), CAR(0,0) which refers to the day of the event, CAR(0,1) and lastly CAR(0,2). T-
statistics, which test the difference from the mean CARs and zero, are reported in parentheses. As shown 
in Table 2, there is statistical significance in the mean for CAR(-1,1) at the 0.10 level and statistical 
significance in the mean for CAR(0,0) and CAR(0,1) at the 0.05 level.  
Column 1 reports the results for CAR(-5,5) which included a mean return of 0.0392, median of 
0.1055 and a t-statistic of 0.70. To put into perspective the abnormality of the mean return, if it were placed 
in annualized terms, meaning, if such an event occurred every 11 days there would have been a mean return 
of 89% in the market. These results ultimately show that investors were anticipating an influx in government 
military spending in preparation for the beginning of a new war.  
Column 2 reports the results for CAR(-1,1), which included a mean return of 0.0640, median of 
0.0832 and a t-statistic of 1.91. Again, to show just how heavily the market reacted to the terrorist attack 
events, this time in a smaller event window, in annualized terms the mean abnormal return would have been 
537% in excess of the market. 
Column 3 reports the results for CAR(0,0), an event window that includes only the day of the event, 
with a mean return of 0.0782, median of 0.0904 and a t-statistic of 2.61. In annualized terms, with the 
smallest event window measured, the annual mean abnormal return would have been 1,970%. This mean 
return is the largest abnormal return within table 2.  
Column 4 reports the results for CAR(0,1), an event window that includes only the day of the event 
and the following day, had a mean return of 0.0717, median of 0.1050 and a t-statistic of 2.20. In annualized 
terms with an event window measuring only one posterior day, the annual mean abnormal return would 
have been 903%.  
Column 5 reports the results for CAR(0,2) an event window that includes the day of the event and 
the 2 trading days following the event, had a mean return of 0.0545, median of 0.0111 and a t-statistic of 
1.26. In annualized terms the annual mean abnormal return would have been 457.8%.   
Each of these columns exhibits substantial cumulative abnormal returns between the 24 companies 
observed. These abnormal returns reflect the assumptions of investors and the market as whole that there 
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are anticipations of a new war presenting itself. Furthermore, these market anticipations are converted into 
the belief that military defense contracts would increase. The need for guns, ammo, missiles, equipment, 
technology, etc. had suddenly become much more prominent.    
 
 Correlation Matrix 
Correlation coefficients measure how strong a relationship is between two variables, +1 being 
identical and -1 being exactly inverse. Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between each of 
the Cumulative Abnormal Returns – measured across various time windows and two measures of lobbying. 
Lobby is an indicator variable equal to unity if a firm had positive lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 
– zero otherwise. LobAmt/Cap is the ratio of the total amount of lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 
scaled by market capitalization. CARs are calculated as the sum of residual returns from a daily market 
model where raw returns for each firm are regressed on the CRSP value-weighted market index during a 
pre-event estimation period. After obtaining intercept and slope parameters from the estimation period, we 
calculate abnormal returns (or residuals) during several different event windows surrounding the event day. 
For example, CAR (-5,5) can be explained as an 11-day event window that includes the 5 days prior to the 
event, the day of the event and the 5 days after the event. Other event windows included in the study are 
CAR(-1,1), CAR (0,0) which refers to the day of the event, CAR(0,1) and lastly CAR(0,2). The p-values 
are reported in brackets. 
We find that the strongest relationship within the correlation matrix between two separate 
coefficients are CAR (-1,1) and CAR (0,1) with a value of .9826. This is explainable because most of the 
relationship is derived from the event day, September 17th, 2001 and the day immediately following. The 
weakest relationship that exists within the matrix is between coefficients CAR (-5,5) and LobAmt/Cap. This 
exhibits that there was not as strong of a relationship between the largest event window of abnormal returns 
and the total amount of lobbying expenditures scaled by market capitalization.  
10 
 
Column 2 shows the highest average of correlation coefficients at .8403. Again, this can the strong 
relationship can be derived by the similarity between CAR (0,0), CAR (0,1) and CAR (0,2). These are the 
event windows where the military defense industry performed the strongest within the financial markets. 
 Looking at column 6 for the variable Lobby we see that the relationship between the indicator 
variable capturing whether a firm had positive lobbying expenditures and the abnormal returns grows 
stronger from the day of the event, CAR (0,0), (0.4640) to the days following the event, CAR (0,1) and 
CAR (0,2), (0.5494). This suggests that potential abnormal returns experienced in the days following the 
event could have been more strongly related to the lobbying expenditures. Column 7 shows that there is a 
moderate relationship between LobAmt/Cap and all cumulative abnormal returns. This indicates that there 
is some relationship between the abnormal returns experienced and the total amount of lobbying 
expenditures scaled by market capitalization. The reported p-values are all less than 0.05 with the highest 
being 0.04 from the correlation coefficient of CAR (-5,5) and LobAmt/Cap. The lowest correlation 
coefficient reported between a cumulative abnormal return and either of the variables Lobby and 
LobAmt/Cap is CAR (-1,1) and Lobby.   
 
Lobby Effect on Abnormal Returns 
Table 4 reports the mean, median, and t-statistic of different cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
of the 24 company share price returns. More detailed within this table is the comparison of values between 
firms that lobbied and firms that did not lobby. Panel A presents the mean, median and t-statistic of the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the 14 firms that lobbied from 1998 to 2001. Panel B represents the mean, 
median and t-statistic of the cumulative abnormal returns of the 10 firms that did not lobby from 1998 to 
2001. As has been mentioned, the abnormal returns ARs are the residual return from a daily market model 
where the raw returns for each firm are regressed on the CRSP value-weighted market index during a pre-
event estimation period. After obtaining intercept and slope parameters from the estimation period, we 
calculate ARs (or residuals) during several different event windows surrounding the event day. For 
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example, CAR(-5,5) can be explained as an 11-day event window that includes the 5 days prior to the event, 
the day of the event and the 5 days after the event. Other event windows included in the study are CAR(-
1,1), CAR(0,0) which refers to the day of the event, CAR(0,1) and lastly CAR(0,2). T-statistics, which test 
the difference from the mean CARs and zero, are reported in parentheses.  
Analyzing panel, A, there were 14 of the 24 companies who did lobby during the four-year period 
from 1998 to 2001. The highest abnormal mean return within the panel came in CAR(-5,5). However, every 
abnormal return was greater than or equal to .1341. To put into perspective the abnormality of these mean 
returns, if each were placed in annualized terms, meaning, if each event occurred within the respective time 
windows of CAR(-5,5), CAR(-1,1),  CAR(0,0),  CAR(0,1) and CAR(0,2) for an entire year, then they would 
experience returns of 341%, 1,159%, 3,379%, 1,745% and 1,142% respectively. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that all cumulative abnormal returns had moderate to strong statistical significance. These results 
ultimately show that investors were anticipating an influx in government military spending in preparation 
for an impending war. 
 Observing panel B, companies who did not lobby, the highest abnormal mean returns came in 
CAR(0,0) which was the only one that didn’t perform with negative mean returns. Every abnormal return 
was less than or equal to 0. As well, none of the cumulative abnormal returns were statistically significant 
at any level. The stock prices of firms within Panel B struggled to perform with positive mean returns during 
each of the event windows observed. Placing the performance of these companies into annualized terms we 
see that for CAR(-5,5), CAR(-1,1),  CAR(0,0),  CAR(0,1) and CAR(0,2)  respectively had annualized 
returns of  -262%, -92%, 0%, -50%,  and -137%. However, we do not observe that any of the mean CARs 
in panel B are statistically significant. In comparison against the annualized mean returns of Panel A, we 
see these drastic differences between abnormal returns demonstrate the markets ability to perceive which 
companies had participated in government lobbying. We can assess from these results that investors not 
only anticipated a new war was approaching in the future but also that the companies who were more 
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politically connected to the government would assumedly receive more military defense contracts then 
companies who were not.   
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 The cross-sectional regression analysis utilized in this study helps us see if there is statistical 
significance associated to our independent variable of political lobbying. We place controlled variables into 
a cross sectional regression to measure their statistical significance in comparison to the independent 
variable. If the controlled variables significantly change the value of the regression, then this signals that 
the level of significance of the independent variable. The adjusted R2 is also included within the study to 
measure the portion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. The 
R2 value adjusts based on the number of independent variables analyzed in the model. 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
 
CAR(j,k)i = β1Lobbyi + β2MktCapi + β3Pricei + β4Turnoveri + β5Volatilityi + β6Spreadi +                      (1) 
β7NYSEi + α + εi 
 
The dependent variable in the cross sectional regression is CAR(j,k), where j = {-1 or 0} and k = {0 or 1}. 
independent variable of interest is Lobby, which is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i lobbied in any 
year from 1998 to 2001. The control variables have been defined previously and include the following. 
MktCap is the total dollar market value of a company’s outstanding shares in $ millions. Price is the price 
of each company share at the close of the day. Turnover is the ratio of daily volume (on the event day) 
scaled by shares outstanding. Volatility is measured as the difference between the natural log of the intraday 
high price and the natural log of the intraday low price (following Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002). 
Spread is the difference between the closing ask and bid prices for a stock – scaled by the spread midpoint. 
NYSE in an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange – zero 
otherwise. T-statistics, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors, are reported in 
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parentheses. Three separate cumulative abnormal return event windows surrounding the opening of the 
financial markets on September 17th, 200l are used, CAR(-1,1), CAR(0,0) and CAR(0,1).  
 Overall, columns 1, 3 and 5 show that the independent variable of interest Lobby was strongly, 
statistically significant within each event window when placed in a regression with only the constant 
variable. This shows that the independent variable is a statistically significant contributor to the abnormal 
returns experienced throughout the event. As columns 2, 4 and 6 show, when the independent variable is 
placed in a regression with all the controlled variables and the constant variable, we find that the 
independent variable, Lobby, is still statistically significant within the event windows of CAR(-1,1) and 
CAR(0,1) with t-statistics of 3.23 and 2.92, respectively. This demonstrates that the primarily on the day 
following the event, the independent variable was statistically significant but was not on the day of the 
event. However, on the day of the event we do not find any variables to be statistically significant. 
Controlled variables that show significance include Turnover and NYSE.  
Turnover shows a strong level of statistical significance in both CAR(-1,1) and CAR(0,1) with t-
values of 3.24 and 3.30. However, just as was shown with the independent variable, most of this significance 
resides in the day following the event. We can assess that there were significant increases in trading on this 
day due to the panic created from the terrorist attacks, thus making this variable strongly significant.  
 NYSE shows a moderate level of statistically significance in both CAR(-1,1) and CAR(0,1) with 
values of -1.83 and -2.02. However, just as was shown with the variable Turnover, most of this significance 
resides in the day following the event. The negative t-statistics results conclude that any company traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange had a negative effect on the overall abnormal returns analyzed. However, 
we note that the coefficient on NYSE is not significant in all three specifications.  
Each of the adjusted R2 for each event window shows that Lobby has a significant effect on the 
dependent variable. In column 1, CAR(-1,1) has an adjusted R2 of 0.2635 and increases to only 0.3731 when 
including all the controlled variables. In column 2, CAR(0,0) has an adjusted R2 of 0.1751 and has a 
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somewhat more significant increase to 0.3790 when including all the controlled variables. In column 3, 
CAR(0,1) has an adjusted R2 of 0.2216 and increases only to 0.3312 when including all the controlled 
variables. These results show that the independent variable Lobby is statistically significant in the variation 
of the dependent variable, abnormal returns.  
The only two variables to report positive statistical significance are Turnover and Lobby. We can 
evaluate that Turnover is positive due to the market investing more money within companies inside the 
military defense industry. We can also determine that Lobby is positive because the market perceived that 
the companies lobbying would potential receive more government contracted military defense spending. 
Both results support our hypothesis that company stock prices within the military defense industry, 
particularly those who lobbied, benefited from the terrorist attack assumedly because of the markets 
anticipations to a new war happening. 
 Table 6 reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
 
CAR(j,k)i = β1LobAmt/Capi + β2MktCapi + β3Pricei + β4Turnoveri + β5Volatilityi +               (2) 
β6Spreadi + β7NYSEi + α + εi 
 
The dependent variable is CAR(j,k), where j = {-1 or 0} and k = {0 or 1}. The independent variable of 
interest is LobAmt/Cap, which is the ratio of total lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 scaled by the 
market cap of the firm on the event day. The control variables have been described previously.  
 Overall, columns 1, 3 and 5 show that the independent variable of interest LobAmt/Cap was 
strongly positive and statistically significant within each event window when placed in a regression with 
only the independent variable of interest. This shows that this independent variable is a statistically 
significant contributor to the abnormal returns experienced throughout the event. As columns 2, 4 and 6 
show, when the independent variable is placed in a regression with all the controlled variables and the 
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constant variable, we find that the independent variable, LobbyAmt/Cap, is still statistically significant 
within the event windows of CAR(-1,1), CAR(0,0) and CAR(0,1) with t-statistics of  and 1.86, 1.74 and 
2.00, respectively. This demonstrates that primarily on the day of the event and the day following the event, 
the independent variable was statistically significant. The only other variable that is significant on the day 
of the event is the controlled variable Turnover.  
Turnover shows a strong level of statistical significance in every abnormal return, CAR(-1,1) 
CAR(0,0) and CAR(0,1) with t-statistic values of 2.81, 4.11 and 2.97, respectively. However, just as was 
shown with the independent variable, most of this significance resides in the day of the event and the day 
following the event. We can assess that there were significant increases in trading on these days due to the 
panic created from the terrorist attacks, thus making this variable strongly significant.  
The adjusted R2 for each event window shows that LobbyAmt/Cap has a small effect on the 
dependent variable. In column 1, CAR(-1,1) has an adjusted R2 of 0.0572 and increases to only 0.2453 when 
including all the controlled variables. This result suggests that lobbying expenditures (relative to market 
capitalization) explain about 6% of the cross-sectional variation in CARs. In column 2, CAR(0,0) has an 
adjusted R2 of 0.0249 and has a somewhat more significant increase to 0.36 when including all the 
controlled variables. In column 3, CAR(0,1) has an adjusted R2 of 0.0385 and increases only to 0.2364 
when including all the controlled variables. These results show that the independent variable LobbyAmt/Cap 
is statistically significant in the variation of the dependent variable, abnormal returns.  
The two variables to report positive statistical significance are Turnover and LobbyAmt/Cap. We 
can evaluate that Turnover is positive due to the market investing more money within companies inside the 
military defense industry. We can also determine that LobbyAmt/Cap is positive because the market 
perceived that the companies lobbying would potential receive more government contracted military 
defense spending.  
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Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper is to explore the effect of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 
2001 on the stock prices of companies within the military defense industry. Furthermore, this paper studies 
the effect of the defense firms’ political engagement (through lobbying activities) and how this affected the 
stock price response to the terrorist attacks. After identifying all companies within the military defense 
industry, standard event studies around the reopening of financial markets on September 17th, 2001 show 
significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns for every event window. The highest abnormal mean 
return for the entire sample reached 7.82% on the day of the event. Furthermore, controlling for the 14 of 
24 companies who had political connections through lobbying activity, we find that each of these firms 
received significantly higher abnormal returns than those who did not. We test the statistical significance 
of the lobbying variables utilized with a cross sectional regression analysis and find both the t-statistics and 
adjusted R2 to be significant. 
The results in this paper are compelling and provide some explanation on the financial market’s 
ability to perceive current events and their potential future outcomes. In several tests, we find that the results 
support our hypothesis that company stock prices within the military defense industry as whole benefited 
from the terrorist attacks. There are two conclusions drawn from these results. First, the abnormal returns 
reflect the assumptions of investors and the financial market that there are anticipations of a new war 
presenting itself. Furthermore, these anticipations are converted into the belief that military defense 
contracts would increase. This means that the need for warfare products such as guns, ammunition, missiles, 
equipment, technology, etc. had suddenly become much more prominent. This in turn ultimately concludes 
that the military defense industry was a benefactor after the horrific results of the terrorist attacks. Second, 
government lobbying provides positive results for all stock prices in military defense industry that 
participate in the event of a terrorist attack. Prior research suggests that lobbying benefits firms for multiple 
reasons which include lower corporate tax liabilities (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2009) and 
better access to debt capital (Chiu and Joh, 2004; Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; and Khwaja 
17 
 
and Mian, 2005). There is an extensive amount of research that could be conducted on the amount of 
government military spending post-September 11th, 2001 with each of these 24 companies. Research can 
be examined to see if financial market anticipations through allocation of investing came to fruition via the 
amount of government contracts received to each of the companies.  
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics – on September 17th, 2001 
 MktCap Price Turnover Spread NYSE Volatility Return 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Honeywell International 23,942.67 29.50 0.0221 0.0037 1 0.1227 -0.1737 
General Dynamics 16,694.07 82.90 0.0305 0.0029 1 0.0697 0.0912 
Curtiss Wright Corp 450.22 44.70 0.0018 0.0078 1 0.0341 -0.0335 
CACI International 577.02 50.47 0.0842 0.0006 0 0.1804 0.2206 
Lockheed Martin 19,161.54 43.95 0.0290 0.0061 1 0.0910 0.1469 
Northrop Grumman Corp 8,094.02 94.80 0.0499 0.0026 1 0.0497 0.1569 
Raytheon Co. B 11,320.38 31.50 0.0615 0.0259 1 0.1957 0.2676 
Harris Corp 1,965.29 29.85 0.0275 0.0074 1 0.1101 0.0978 
Comtech Tele. Corp 109.58 14.75 0.0178 0.0168 0 0.1406 0.0206 
Cubic Corp 269.88 30.30 0.0047 0.0066 0 0.0605 0.0775 
Barnes Group 406.55 22.01 0.0013 0.0009 1 0.0086 -0.0086 
Esterline Tech. Corp 341.35 16.50 0.0072 0.0120 1 0.0977 -0.0934 
Hexcel Corp New 254.79 6.95 0.0029 0.0330 1 0.1417 -0.1258 
Ducommun Inc. De 116.16 12.00 0.0060 0.0292 1 0.0729 -0.1459 
Sturm Ruger & Co Inc. 277.18 10.30 0.0093 0.0097 1 0.0713 0.1075 
Ultralife Batteries 58.25 4.75 0.0009 0.0296 0 0.1129 -0.0686 
Flir Systems Inc. 526.70 34.89 0.0590 0.0012 0 0.2499 0.2073 
Sypris Solutions Inc. 95.60 9.75 0.0000 0.0253 0 0.0003 0.0000 
Triumph Group Inc. 486.54 34.80 0.0235 0.0075 1 0.1393 -0.2089 
Elbit Systems Ltd 448.04 17.39 0.0073 0.0069 0 0.1151 0.1162 
Viasat Inc. 337.72 14.93 0.0145 0.0027 0 0.1823 -0.0399 
L3 Comm. Holdings Inc. 3,390.13 87.00 0.1863 0.0001 1 0.0910 0.3810 
Teledyne Tech 539.09 17.00 0.0299 0.0018 1 0.1490 0.1822 
Taser International 22.77 8.40 0.0406 0.0036 0 0.1691 -0.0400 
The Table reports summary statistics that describe the sample of 24 companies on September 17 th, 2001 – the day that 
U.S. financial markets reopened after the September 11th Attacks. Each variable of stock data was obtained from The 
Center for Research Stock Prices (CRSP). MktCap is the total dollar market value of a company’s outstanding shares in $ 
millions. Price is the price of each company share at the close of the day. Turnover is the ratio of daily volume (on the 
event day) scaled by shares outstanding. Spread is the difference between the closing ask and bid prices for a stock – 
scaled by the spread midpoint. NYSE in an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange – zero otherwise. Volatility is measured as the difference between the natural log of the intraday high price and 
the natural log of the intraday low price (following Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002). Return is the CRSP raw return 
on the event day: September 17th, 2001. 
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Table 2 – Standard Event Study – All Firms around Terrorist Attack 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Mean 0.0392 0.0640* 0.0782** 0.0717** 0.0545 
      
Median 0.1055 0.0832 0.0904 0.1050 0.1110 
      
t-statistic (0.70) (1.91) (2.61) (2.20) (1.26) 
N 24 24 24 24 24 
The Table reports the mean, median, and t-statistic of different cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the 24 
company share price returns. Abnormal Returns Ars are the residual return from a daily market model where raw 
returns for each firm are regressed on the CRSP value-weighted market index during a pre-event estimation period. 
After obtaining intercept and slope parameters from the estimation period, we calculate Ars (or residuals) during 
several different event windows surrounding the event day. CAR(-5,5), for example, is the cumulative Ars for the 
eleven-day window surrounding the event day. Likewise, CAR(-1,1) is the cumulative Ars for the three-day period 
surrounding the event day.  T-statistics, which test the difference from the mean CARs and zero, are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) Lobby LobAmt/Cap 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
CAR (-5,5) 1.0000 0.8800 0.8113 0.8913 0.9435 0.4884 0.4219 
  [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0155] [0.0400] 
CAR (-1,1)  1.0000 0.9487 0.9826 0.9435 0.5861 0.5411 
   [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0026] [0.0063] 
CAR (0,0)   1.0000 0.9565 0.8817 0.4640 0.4571 
    [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0224] [0.0247] 
CAR (0,1)    1.0000 0.9365 0.5494 0.5325 
     [<.0001] [0.0054] [0.0074] 
CAR (0,2)     1.0000 0.5494 0.4765 
      [0.0054] [0.0186] 
Lobby      1.0000 0.8871 
       [<.0001] 
LobAmt/Cap       1.0000 
        
The Table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between each of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns – measured 
across various time windows and two measures of lobbying. Lobby is an indicator variable equal to unity if a firm had 
positive lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 – zero otherwise. LobAmt/Cap is the ratio of the total amount of 
lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 scaled by market capitalization. CARs are calculated as the sum of residual 
returns from a daily market model where raw returns for each firm are regressed on the CRSP value-weighted market 
index during a pre-event estimation period. After obtaining intercept and slope parameters from the estimation period, 
we calculate abnormal returns (or residuals) during a number of different event windows surrounding the event day. 
CAR(-5,5), for example, is the cumulative ARs for the eleven-day window surrounding the event day. Likewise, 
CAR(-1,1) is the cumulative ARs for the three-day period surrounding the event day. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4 – Standard Event Study – All Firms around Terrorist Attacks 
Panel A. Firms that Lobbied 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Mean 0.1489** 0.1380*** 0.1341*** 0.1385*** 0.1360** 
      
Median 0.1839 0.1470 0.1528 0.1584 0.1485 
      
t-statistic (2.57) (3.54) (3.32) (3.54) (2.57) 
N 14 14 14 14 14 
Panel B. Firms that did not Lobbied 
Mean -0.1144 -0.0400 0.0000 -0.0219 -0.0596 
      
Median -0.0174 0.0086 -0.0052 0.0211 -0.0076 
      
T-stat (-1.27) (-0.93) (0.00) (-0.52) (-1.03) 
N 10 10 10 10 10 
The Table reports the mean, median, and t-statistic of different cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the 24 
company share price returns. Panel A presents the mean, median and t-statistic of the cumulative abnormal returns 
of the 14 firms that lobbied from 1998 to 2001. Panel B represents the mean, median and t-statistic of the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the 10 firms that did not lobby from 1998 to 2001. Abnormal Returns ARs are the residual return 
from a daily market model where raw returns for each firm are regressed on the CRSP value-weighted market index 
during a pre-event estimation period. After obtaining intercept and slope parameters from the estimation period, we 
calculate ARs (or residuals) during a number of different event windows surrounding the event day. CAR(-5,5), for 
example, is the cumulative ARs for the eleven-day window surrounding the event day. Likewise, CAR(-1,1) is the 
cumulative ARs for the three-day period surrounding the event day.  T-statistics, which test the difference from the 
mean CARs and zero, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 – Cross-sectional Regressions 
 CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,1) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lobby 0.1775*** 0.1607* 0.1340** 0.0817 0.1604*** 0.1430* 
 (3.23) (2.08) (2.70) (1.24) (2.92) (1.87) 
MktCap  -0.0000  -0.0000  -8.6E-7 
  (-0.26)  (-0.24)  (-0.15) 
Price  -0.0009  -0.0003  -0.0008 
  (-0.47)  (-0.20)  (-0.42) 
Turnover  2.1022***  2.2961***  2.0484*** 
  (3.24)  (4.39)  (3.30) 
Volatility  -0.4325  -0.2060  -0.4076 
  (-0.88)  (-0.54)  (-0.87) 
Spread  -1.6171  -1.3375  -1.2656 
  (-0.55)  (-0.52)  (-0.42) 
NYSE  -0.0984*  -0.0561  -0.1078* 
  (-1.83)  (-1.22)  (-2.02) 
Constant -0.0395 0.0661 0.0000 0.0474 -0.0219 0.0799 
 (-0.98) (0.77) (0.00) (0.63) (-0.55) (0.95) 
       
Adj. R2 0.2635 0.3731 0.1751 0.3790 0.2216 0.3312 
Robust SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(j,k)i = β1Lobbyi + β2MktCapi + β3Pricei + β4Turnoveri + β5Volatilityi + β6Spreadi + β7NYSEi + α + εi 
The dependent variable is CAR(j,k), where j = {-1 or 0} and k = {0 or 1}. The independent variable of interest is 
Lobby, which is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i lobbied in any year from 1998 to 2001. The control 
variables include the following. MktCap is the total dollar market value of a company’s outstanding shares in $ 
millions. Price is the price of each company share at the close of the day. Turnover is the ratio of daily volume (on 
the event day) scaled by shares outstanding. Volatility is measured as the difference between the natural log of the 
intraday high price and the natural log of the intraday low price (following Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 
2002).Spread is the difference between the closing ask and bid prices for a stock – scaled by the spread midpoint. 
NYSE in an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange – zero otherwise. 
T-statistics, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 – Cross-sectional Regressions 
 CAR (-1,1) CAR (0) CAR (0,1) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
LobAmt/Cap 36.6740** 29.8530* 27.1400* 21.3715* 35.4446** 29.1927* 
 (2.25) (1.86) (1.88) (1.74) (2.46) (2.00) 
MktCap  8.1E-8  -4.6E-9  0.0000 
  (0.14)  (-0.00)  (0.21) 
Price  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0005 
  (-0.27)  (-0.25)  (-0.30) 
Turnover  2.4144**  2.5354***  2.3604*** 
  (2.81)  (4.11)  (2.97) 
Volatility  -0.1204  -0.0561  -0.1337 
  (-0.25)  (-0.16)  (-0.29) 
Spread  -2.2533  -1.6746  -1.8375 
  (-0.80)  (-0.67)  (-0.64) 
NYSE  -0.0697  -0.0377  -0.0807 
  (-1.10)  (-0.72)  (-1.30) 
Constant 0.02970 0.0559 0.0528 0.0403 0.0385 0.0700 
 (0.77) (0.62) (1.58) (0.51) (1.03) (0.79) 
       
Adj. R2 0.0572 0.2453 0.0249 0.3600 0.0560 0.2364 
Robust SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(j,k)i = β1LobAmt/Capi + β2MktCapi + β3Pricei + β4Turnoveri + β5Volatilityi + β6Spreadi + β7NYSEi + α + εi 
The dependent variable is CAR(j,k), where j = {-1 or 0} and k = {0 or 1}. The independent variable of interest is 
LobAmt/Cap, which is the ratio of total lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2001 scaled by the market cap of the 
firm on the event day. The control variables include the following. MktCap is the total dollar market value of a 
company’s outstanding shares in $ millions. Price is the price of each company share at the close of the day. 
Turnover is the ratio of daily volume (on the event day) scaled by shares outstanding. Volatility is measured as the 
difference between the natural log of the intraday high price and the natural log of the intraday low price (following 
Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002).Spread is the difference between the closing ask and bid prices for a stock – 
scaled by the spread midpoint. NYSE in an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange – zero otherwise. T-statistics, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors, are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
